U-boat action Wilhelm Zahn



a g7e torpedo (middle) similar ones used u-56 against nelson.


he fired 3 torpedoes u-56 s 3 torpedo tubes toward flagship. 3 struck hull of nelson failed explode, although sound of impact nelson s hull picked sonar operators of u-56. third torpedo subsequently exploded @ sea without causing damage. incident has been described important non-sinking of conflict. after attack zahn became known man killed churchill amongst u-boat submariner corps.


after attack, zahn ordered u-boat descend deeper level avoid depth charges since destroyers had detected presence. in evening zahn ordered u-56 surface , subsequently sent radio report berlin listing targets in group including hms rodney. delay in transmission of information caused zahn s depression caused missing target. had delay in zahn s report not happened, german command have sent u-58, in area @ time, renew attack on british targets.


because of failure destroy nelson, zahn became depressed , karl dönitz had felt obliged relieve him of u-56 command , sent him germany become instructor. later, in memoirs, dönitz called failed attack u-56 exceptionally serious failure did not blame zahn daring, in presence of destroyers, praised, saying commander had delivered attack great daring when surrounded twelve escorting destroyers, depressed failure, in in no way blame, felt compelled withdraw him time being active operations , employ him instructor @ home . in addition dönitz had received reports men concerning problems defective g7e torpedoes using , knew failures caused faulty torpedoes. zahn recovered , later year given command of u-69.


u-69

on 30 october 1941 zahn took command of u-69 first time. u-boat s sixth patrol, previous 5 patrols being under lieutenant commander jost metzler when february july 1941 sank approximately eleven british ships of 50,000 gross register tons (grt). once @ sea zahn opened sealed mission orders dönitz instructing him go störtebeker patrol zone named after german pirate, lying east of azores. search supply ships originating cape town , going england through gibraltar under code name os11. on 3 november 1941 zahn reached area , wrote in log begins tedious business of searching .


on 23 november u-69 ordered naval command sail sector ak in atlantic southeast of greenland , southwest of iceland. through adverse weather u-69 set new course. @ 8 p.m. on 26 november 1941 zahn under inclement weather decided track lone freighter moving in heavy seas under snow , hail. after 2 hours of sailing on surface zahn decided on surface attack against freighter , released 4 torpedoes of failed hit target. zahn ordered submarine submerge load 4 tubes new torpedoes , upon resurfacing target not located again. although dönitz sent messages concerning more targets after u-69 not able locate them , on 3 december ordered st. nazaire. upon arrival, after 39 days of patrol in atlantic, captain eberhard godt, u-boat chief of operations, reprimanded zahn failure sink targets , although acknowledged impact of severe weather told zahn in future not submerge such long time reload torpedo tubes perform partial reloading save time.


in morning of 18 january 1942 u-69 zahn in command left st. nazaire setting course toward mid-atlantic. u-69 came within 500 miles of long island, new york , since running low on fuel , not positively identify potential target enemy vessel, zahn decided not attack. u-69 ordered closer american coast after increased anti-submarine activity zahn decided on sailing grand banks near newfoundland. on 17 march 1942, after more unsuccessful encounters @ sea, zahn brought u-69 st. nazaire after mission in atlantic lasting thirty 8 days without sinking ship. dönitz, in post-mission appraisal report of zahn s actions, wrote although opportunities presented commander once again has had no success. cannot attributed solely lack of luck. commander lacks skill both in general operations , in attacking. dönitz did not approve of zahn s tactics of following convoy of ships instead of launching attack against during day , blamed him not following convoy closely enough , losing contact eventually, saying proper tactics have been head convoy @ full speed , decide on daylight attack-or @ least have kept close enemy not lose him, case here . relieved zahn of command of u-69 , appointed him different post.








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