Northwest Europe Tank destroyer battalion (United States)

m10 tank destroyer in action near saint-lô, june 1944.

by far largest employment of tank destroyer units in north-western europe campaign through france, low countries , germany. employed beginning of campaign, 1 battalion being landed on utah beach in follow-up wave on d-day.

a revised version of field manual 18-5, introduced in june 1944, broadened doctrine of tank destroyer operations. allowed more dispersed deployment of battalions throughout force, , recommended when enemy armor expected deployed in small groups, tank destroyers distributed among forward units. became general practice attach tank destroyer battalion semi-permanently division; meant locally available emergencies, , able train alongside division when out of line.

the significant employment of tank destroyers in normandy in august, @ battle of mortain, 823rd tank destroyer battalion (towed 3-inch guns) on defensive alongside 30th infantry division. division, in temporary positions , not prepared defensive engagement, attacked elements of 4 panzer divisions on 6 august, under heavy fog. 823rd put strong defense—knocking out fourteen tanks—but took heavy losses, being overrun , losing eleven guns. served reinforce misgivings effectiveness of towed units, , report delivered pentagon in december recommended phased out in favor of self-propelled units.

in december 1944, , january 1945, battle of bulge put american ground forces on operational defensive first time in europe, german army group of 24 divisions (including ten panzer divisions 1,500 armored vehicles) launched major offensive in ardennes forest. main thrust fell on 99th , 2nd infantry divisions jammed northern shoulder. secondary attack hit 2 overstretched infantry divisions, both attached towed tank destroyer battalions. once contact made, towed guns unable reposition or withdraw, , overrun enemy advance, or outflanked infantry. gun crews, unlike self-propelled counterparts, had no protection against small-arms fire, , driven squad of infantry. lack of mobility aggravated cold wet weather, , rough conditions, tended bog down wheeled vehicles , immobilize fixed guns. throughout 1st army whole, three-quarters of tank destroyers lost towed rather self-propelled. 1 battalion, 801st, lost 17 towed guns in 2 days, while m10-equipped 644th, fought alongside it, found ideal opportunities close-range ambushes , claimed 17 tanks in same time period. clear towed guns had proved ineffective , on 11 january 1945, u.s. war office approved eisenhower s request convert remaining towed units in theatre self-propelled guns.

tank destroyers found throughout fighting in battle of bulge, fighting @ close range in broken terrain had done in italy. used during ardennes fighting, in northern sector around malmedy, spa, stoumont. large numbers involved in several actions against tanks of kampfgruppe peiper, spearhead of german 6. panzer army, around la gleize. elements of 740th tank destroyer battalion , 823rd tank destroyer battalion closed remouchamps deployed defensive positions in front of stoumont alongside elements of 3rd armored division, 30th infantry division , 82nd airborne division.

the 705th, equipped m18s, fought alongside 101st airborne @ siege of bastogne, , played key role in defense of town. 4 m-18s , platoon of infantry occupied noville, north of bastogne, , stopped german armored attack flank fires, killing 30 heavy tanks (panthers , tigers). battle first major engagement of m36, 90 mm gun; 3 battalions employed proved highly effective.

the mobile defense of battle of st. vith involved m36 tank destroyers blunting german armored thrusts. once these thrusts halted, tank companies counter-attack.

while tank destroyers broadly used in intended role in ardennes—being used reserve counter massed armored attack—there 2 significant differences between use , original doctrine. firstly, there no central strategic reserve—most tank destroyer battalions assigned divisions , kept near front line, rather massed in rear. secondly, battalions committed whole; had become common, used local anti-tank assets, platoon or company assigned infantry battalion bolster defensive strength.

after losses in battle of bulge, german armored capability in west had collapsed, both through combat losses , through logistical limitations. such, tank destroyer battalions spent closing months of war mobile support units, parceled out secondary roles.