The Varieties of Reference Gareth Evans (philosopher)

1 varieties of reference

1.1 background
1.2 evans s project
1.3 kinds of reference
1.4 language issues

the varieties of reference

evans s book varieties of reference (1982) unfinished @ time of death. edited publication, , supplemented appendices drawn notes, mcdowell, , has subsequently been influential in both philosophy of mind , philosophy of language.

background

the theory of reference prior 1970s dominated view meaning of ordinary name description of object: so, example, aristotle means author of de caelo. russell s view, , , taken many equivalent frege s view (where description frege calls term s sense ). following kripke s naming , necessity (1972/1980) lectures, view came prevail names had no descriptive content, or sense: referent of name not fit meaning, whichever object had been initial cause of name s being used.

evans s project

evans concedes names not in general have descriptive meanings (although contends could, in cases), argues proponents of new theory had simplistic view. argues calls russell s principle: person cannot thinking object unless knows, in non-trivial way, object thinking about. in particular, evans argues person must have discriminating conception of object (1982, p. 65).

from russell s work, evans draws point of thoughts 1 has (thoughts objects 1 perceiving, example) such if object did not exist not possible think thought @ all. these calls russellian thoughts.

he claims version of new theory, calls photograph model of mental representation (1982, p. 78), violates russell s principle. according photograph model, causal antecedents of information involved in mental state... claimed sufficient determine object state concerns (1982, p. 78). (the view named because similar view many people take on how photograph comes something.) thus, on photograph model, contrary russell s principle, 1 may have thought object without discriminating knowledge of object, long mental state caused in appropriate way (for example, perhaps sort of causal chain originates object).

evans argues causal theory, of photograph model, must restricted in ways: necessary consider, 1 one, various kinds of russellian thoughts people can have objects, , specify in each case conditions must met them meet russell s principle—only under conditions can 1 have thought specific object or objects (a singular thought).

in particular, evans discusses @ length calls generality constraint. evans states thus:

...if subject can credited thought f, must have conceptual resources entertaining thought g, every property of being g of has conception (1982, p. 104).

the generality constraint, according evans, intended capture structure there in thought. evans puts it, thought john happy has in common thought harry happy, , thought john happy has in common thought john sad (1982, p. 100). generality constraint requires if 1 have thought (that john happy, example) object (john), 1 must able conceive of object (john) having different properties (such being sad).

he defends reading of frege, derived in part michael dummett s work, according frege s notion of sense not equivalent description, , indeed remains essential theory of reference abandoned descriptivism (1982, §1.3).

kinds of reference

the bulk of text considers 3 kinds of reference objects, , argues number of conditions must obtain reference occur.

he considers first demonstrative reference, 1 speaks or thinks object visible in 1 s vicinity. argues these presuppose, among other things: having correct conception of kind of object is; ability conceive of , oneself located in objective space, , orient oneself within space; 1 must move smoothly through time , space , able track object s movements continuously in perception.

he next considers reference oneself , reference way of capacity recognition: 1 s ability (re-)identify object when presented it, if not available @ present. evans famously considers phenomenon of immunity error through misidentification—a phenomenon of types of judgment in 1 cannot wrong object judgment misidentifying (see 1982, §6.6 & §7.2). phenomenon may exemplified incoherence of following judgment (upon feeling pain): seems feeling pain, feeling pain? . while phenomenon has been noticed philosophers before, evans argues have tended think applies judgments concerning oneself , 1 s conscious experiences, , have failed recognise more general phenomenon can occur in sort of demonstrative judgment. furthermore, charge philosophers such ludwig wittgenstein (in blue , brown books [1958]) , elizabeth anscombe (in first person [1975]) having wrongly concluded such cases show first-person pronoun not refer anything.

language issues

in last third of book evans turns problems reference objects actively depend on use of language. here treats use of proper names, not seem presuppose knowledge on part of speaker demonstrative or recognition-based identification. 1 can refer object 1 has never encountered using name if name received in right sort of linguistic (social) practice—even, apparently, if 1 has no true beliefs object. considers problems of reference objects in fictions , hallucinations, , meaning of saying exists doesn t. (here draws explicitly on kripke s john locke lectures, reference , existence).